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Platonic Love in a Colorado Courtroom:
Martha Nussbaum, John Finnis, and
Plato's Laws in Evans v. Romer
Randall Baldwin Clark*
I. RELEVANT FOR FIFTEEN MINUTES-OR THIRTY CENTURIES?
To the ridicule of the highbrow popular press' and the surprise of
classical scholars,2 Plato's Laws,3 a work which was mocked, even in
* University of Virginia School of Law, Class of 2002. Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1998.
Research Associate, Dartmouth College Department of Government, 1997-99. Author, THE
LAW MOST BEAUTIFUL AND BEST: MEDICAL ARGUMENT AND MAGICAL RHETORIC IN
PLATO'S LAWS (Rowman & Littlefield - Lexington Books, forthcoming 2001). This article has
benefited from the comments of many friends, colleagues, and teachers. For their assistance, I
would like to thank Danielle Allen, Larry Arnhart, Richard 0. Brooks, Robert A. Burt,
Allison D. Clark, Andrew P. Clark, Elizabeth A. Clark, Glenn W. Clark, Matthew Crawford,
Richard Dougherty, Martha A. Field, Shawntel R. Fugate, Martin P. Golding, L. Kent
Greenawalt, A.E. Dick Howard, Leon R. Kass, Matthew Kutcher, Melissa S. Lane, Mark J.
Lutz, Roger D. Masters, Lynn Mather, Angelia K. Means, Ted H. Miller, S. Sarah Monoson,
David Peritz, Richard A. Posner, Christopher Rohrbacher, Ariel C. Silver, Nathan Tarcov,
Bradley A. Thayer, Elizabeth E. Theran, Paul Ulrich, Eduardo A. Velasquez, Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Martin D. Yaffe, and the members of my edit team at the Yale Journal of Law & the
Humanities. I only regret that I was unable to address all of their criticisms. Particularly
profound appreciation is owed to my friend and colleague, James B. Murphy, whose queries
helped me conceive this work and whose encouragement brought it to light: aneu gar phil6n
oudeis heloit' an zen. Financial support for my research was generously provided by the Joseph
B. Obering Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, the
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and the Dartmouth College Department of
Government.
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Sodom and Demurrer: Should the Courts Deliver Gay Civil
Rights?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1993, at 16.
2. See, e.g., John M. Rist, Plato and Professor Nussbaum on Acts 'Contrary to Nature', in
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antiquity, for its aesthetic frigidity,4 has enjoyed of late a remarkable
fifteen minutes in the sun. In "expert witness" testimony and
affidavits5 submitted in October 1993 to a Colorado district court in
Evans v. Romer,' and in subsequent clarificatory (and obfuscatory)
articles,7 three prominent scholars, John Finnis, Martha Nussbaum,
and Robert George, vituperatively contended over the potentially
pejorative meaning of the word tolm~ma at 636c of this lengthy
Platonic dialogue.8 Finnis and George, for their part, argued that this
term is inherently aspersive- "those first guilty of such enormities
(tolmema) were impelled by their slavery to pleasure"-and sought
to show that this passage's characterization of homosexual sodomy
as "contrary to nature" (para phusin) demonstrates Plato's antipathy
toward homosexual conduct as well as his affirmation of the moral
centrality of wedded heterosexual intercourse. Nussbaum, in
rebuttal, claimed that this passage, when translated in a morally
"neutral" manner-she prefers "those who first ventured to do
this"-is generally supportive of her (and Plato's) view of homosex-
STUDIES IN PLATO AND THE PLATONIC TRADITION: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO JOHN
WHITTAKER 65 (Mark Joyal ed., 1997); Mary R. Lefkowitz, Contemporary Culture, in TIMES
LIT. Supp., Mar. 17, 1995, at 23.
3. PLATO, LAWS (Thomas Pangle ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1988).
4. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1265al-2 (Stephen Everson ed. & Benjamin Jowett
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988); LUCIAN, ICAROMENIPPUS OR THE SKY MAN 24 (A.M.
Harmon ed. & trans., Loeb Classical Library 1915).
5. Addendum to Rebuttal Affidavit of John Finnis (Oct. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Finnis
Addendum to Rebuttal Affidavit]; Rebuttal Affidavit of Robert George (Oct. 22, 1993);
Rebuttal Affidavit of John Finnis (Oct. 21, 1993); Affidavit of Martha Nussbaum (Oct. 21,
1993) [hereinafter Nussbaum Affidavit]; Testimony of Robert George (Oct. 20, 1993)
[hereinafter George Testimony]; Testimony of Martha Nussbaum (Oct. 15, 1993) [hereinafter
Nussbaum Testimony]; Affidavit of John Finnis (Oct. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Finnis Affidavit];
Deposition of Robert George (Oct. 8, 1993); Expert Witness Summary for Professor Martha
Nussbaum [hereinafter Nussbaum Summary]. The docket number for Evans v. Romer is
92CV7223.
6. Evans v. Romer, 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,719 (Colo. D. Ct. 1993), affd, 882 P.2d
1335 (Colo. 1994), afftd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7. For Finnis's contribution, see John Finnis, "Shameless Acts" in Colorado: Abuse of
Scholarship in Constitutional Cases, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Fall 1994, at 10 [hereinafter Finnis,
"Shameless Acts"]; John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11 (1995). (In a later essay, Finnis continued his discussion of some of
the issues raised in the case. See John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual
Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997).)
Nussbaum responded with Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek
Norms to Modern Sexual Controversies, 80 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1994) [hereinafter Platonic
Love], an abridged version of which was later reprinted in SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 299
(1999). George made his public contribution in "Shameless Acts" Revisited: Some Questions for
Martha Nussbaum, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Winter 1995-96, at 24. Like Finnis, George has
continued to address the broader normative issues raised by this debate. See Patrick Lee &
Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 AM. J.
JURIS. 135 (1997).
8. All citations of the Laws in this essay use the Stephanus pagination, a reference system
common to almost every published version of this work.
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ual relations as benign, even salutary.9
The pretext for these philological exertions in a Denver district
courtroom was not, we note with some regret, the judge's abiding
interest in the tolma6 verb family, but rather an issue of somewhat
greater legal import. Did Amendment 2 to the Colorado
Constitution-which forbade any state agency from designating
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual "orientation, conduct, practices, or
relationships" as the basis for protected legal status"- constitute an
impermissible establishment of religion on account of its allegedly
irrational hostility toward homosexuals?
The history of the case is well known, but bears repetition."
Shortly after Amendment 2 passed in a 1992 referendum with fifty-
three percent of the vote, a group of plaintiffs obtained an injunction
from District Court Judge H. Jeffrey Bayless. Ultimately upheld by
the Colorado Supreme Court, the case was sent back to the same
judge for trial. Among the various arguments presented by the
plaintiffs in the pre-trial motions was the claim that, because "the
'moral judgment' expressed by Amendment 2 is nothing more than
irrational hostility toward lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals,
Amendment 2 does not serve any legitimate purpose. 1 2 They
argued, therefore, that this amendment constituted an impermissible
establishment of religion: "Amendment 2 is based upon and
embodies a particular religious view regarding gay, lesbian and
bisexual orientation.'
13
Hoping to counter these arguments, Tim Tymkovich, the Solicitor
General of Colorado, enlisted the services of John Finnis, Professor
of Law and Legal Philosophy at Oxford and an author of treatises on
natural law jurisprudence. In his affidavit, Finnis argued for the
presence in the Western legal and philosophical tradition of a non-
biblical civic antipathy toward the practice of homosexual congress.
9. See, e.g., Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 17. In my efforts in this Article to make
sense of the Laws and the various commentaries thereupon, I will make use of three terms-
sodomy, homosexuality, and pederasty-to describe various manifestations of homoerotic
behavior considered in the dialogue. I do so with some apprehension, for I recognize that these
English words describe phenomena which are both distinct and overlapping, and map very
poorly onto ancient conceptions. I have, therefore, gone to great pains to ensure that on each
occasion in which I refer to one of these words, my usage most clearly and accurately
represents the sense of the passage under consideration. On no occasion in this Article,
however, do I intend to speak of either heterosexual pederasty or sodomitic relations between
men and women.
10. COLO. CONST. amend. II.
11. For an even-handed account of the trial and the events leading up to it, see Daniel
Mendelsohn, The Stand: Expert Witnesses and Ancient Mysteries in a Colorado Courtroom,
LINGUA FRANCA, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 34.
12. Id. at 36.
13. Amended Complaint $ 42 (Dec. 23, 1992).
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In these efforts to demonstrate a secular and rational condemnation
of sodomy in this tradition, Finnis treated a broad range of thinkers,
extending forward to Kant and Hume, but located its genesis in the
Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.14
To rebut Finnis's arguments, the plaintiffs engaged Martha
Nussbaum, then Professor of Classics and Philosophy at Brown,
whose pre-trial summary statement claimed that "prior to the
Christian tradition there is no evidence that natural-law theories
regarded same-sex erotic attachments as immoral, 'unnatural,' or
improper."15 As she went on to argue in this document, any natural
law theory-such as that advanced by John Finnis-that "condemns
gay or lesbian sexual conduct and relationships as a violation of
natural law or natural human good.., is inherently theological."' 6 To
argue against her claim that Western moral objections to
homosexual conduct have no extra-biblical and hence no rational
basis, the defense subsequently called in Robert George, Professor
of Politics at Princeton.
As a result of the sharp disagreement between the views expressed
(and methods employed) in Nussbaum's and George's testimonies,
all three parties saw fit to clarify and expand their arguments: Each
of them submitted to the court at least another written explication of
his or her own position along with a criticism of the other side. So
sharp were their disagreements, however, that, even after Judge
Bayless had handed down a verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the
antagonists have continued-some to this day-to prosecute their
arguments in scholarly fora."7
Even though these witnesses' various efforts to demonstrate, in
this single modern case, the presence or absence in the Western
tradition of a rational, non-religious civic antipathy toward
homosexual congress revealed to the court and the academy a
panoramic view of Western philosophy, a particularly privileged
place in this debate was given to the Laws. As Finnis boldly
declared: In this dialogue can be found several "unmistakably clear"
attacks on the "unnatural" act of sodomitic congress. 8 The same
Plato, he wrote, who celebrated "romantic and spiritual"
homosexual relations in the Symposium "also made very clear that
all forms of sexual conduct outside heterosexual marriage are
14. See Finnis Affidavit, supra note 5, 1 29-53.
15. Nussbaum Summary, supra note 5, at 1.
16. Id. at 2.
17. See supra note 7.
18. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation, " supra note 7, at 23.
[Vol. 12:1
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shameful, wrongful and harmful."19 Nussbaum directed even more
energy towards problematizing these passages to which Finnis refers.
Her post-trial piece in the Virginia Law Review, "Platonic Love and
Colorado Law," is remarkable for its careful scrutiny of these
purportedly "unmistakably clear" attacks on homosexuality in the
Laws.'
Although Plato's scholarly cheerleaders (like myself) are no doubt
pleased that this obscure and underappreciated dialogue has had
occasion to occupy center stage, if only briefly, in this momentous
public debate, they do have some cause for discomfort with the
treatment it has received from these "expert witnesses." Valuable
and interesting questions were in fact raised by the testimony and
subsequent debate: Is homosexual congress unnatural (and what
does that imply)? How can we assess the moral character of sexual
behavior? And, quite pressingly, what role should the state play in
shaping our proclivities and restricting our (self-)injurious behavior?
But the rich texture of Plato's consideration thereof was entirely
overlooked as the various partisans sought to advance their
respective political agenda by adducing and rebutting proof-text
references to the Laws.
Much of this trivialization of the Laws-viz., the treatment of a
philosophical text with the disrespectful exegesis traditionally
accorded only to sacred writ-is due, no doubt, to the partisan
character of legal discourse: Each sought to prove his or her point to
an untutored judge and adduced plausible arguments and Platonic
passages supportive thereof. Less understandable, however, is the
persistence of this methodology in the post-trial publications
proffered by each of the participants. Finnis and George, in each of
their articles in Academic Questions, return to the question-vigor-
ously contested in the trial itself-of the proper translation of
tolmbma at 636c.21 But even as they argued that Finnis's reliance on
R.G. Bury's translation22 of this word as "enormities" is not
unreasonable, they largely left to the side their substantive claims
concerning the moral centrality of wedded love in the Laws. Instead,
they directed their energy toward castigating as perjury Nussbaum's
representation to the court that the 1897 version of Liddell & Scott's
A Greek-English Lexicon-containing an entry for tolm~ma more
friendly to her cause than those set out in the more recent (1940 and
19. Finnis Affidavit, supra note 5, J 37.
20. Nussbaum, Platonic Love, supra note 7.
21. See Finnis, "Shameless Acts," supra note 7, at 19-35; George, "Shameless Acts"
Revisted, supra note 7, at 24-36.
22. PLATO, LAWS (R.G. Bury ed. & trans., Loeb Classical Library 1926).
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1968) editions of this classic work-was the "authoritative dictionary
relied on by all scholars in this area. '
Nussbaum, for her part, confronts the substantive question-what
does Plato say in the Laws about homosexual intercourse?-head-
on, but does so in an entirely unsatisfactory manner. While she
brings tremendous philological acumen to bear on the several
passages in which homosexual desire is treated, she does so in a
misleading manner: Textual molehills are consistently surveyed as
insurmountable mountains and clear condemnations are presented
as rhetorical Gordian knots. Most distressing of all, in her eagerness
to argue-to both the court and the academy-for the benign (if not
wholly praiseworthy) character of homosexual congress, Nussbaum
fails to situate the Laws' condemnations within the broader, and
much more illuminating, context of this dialogue's overall treatment
of sexual desire, its relationship to the family, and the state's interest
in regulating both.
This is, I believe, a shame. For the Laws offers its readers a
provocative presentation of the problematic character of both
homosexual desire and the family, as well as a thoughtful consider-
ation of the appropriate governmental role in the regulation of
both-pressing issues still. Had these disputants-after the hour of
the agon passed-favored us with a more leisurely, even scholarly,
consideration of these questions, we might have learned something
about Plato's views concerning the narcissistic character of
(homo)erotic desire, the fragility of family life, and the city's interest
in the gentle redirection of the former in order to sustain the latter.
These are, no doubt, contentious claims, both in Plato's time and in
our own. Many of those (myself included) who observed the progress
of Romer as it passed through the courts likely harbor views quite
different from the various arguments Plato's interlocutors present
over the course of the Laws. None of us, however, regardless of
personal opinions concerning these matters, were particularly well
served when the import of this potentially eye-opening dialogue was
obscured by the provocation of legal catfights and the stirring-up of
philological duststorms. Plato records his teacher's claim to act as a
gadfly, stinging his somnolent fellows to an awareness of their
ignorance. Plato's mature consideration of these issues in the Laws
could come as a pique to our own thoughtless prejudice, no matter
where it might lie. None of this can occur, however, unless we allow
him to engage us, not in contextually unencumbered sound-bites, but
on his own discursive terms.
23. Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 10. See Finnis, "Shameless Acts," supra note 7, at
19-35; George, "Shameless Acts" Revisted, supra note 7, at 24-36.
[Vol. 12:1
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II. HOMOPHOBIA: PAULINE OR PLATONIC?
The primary interpretive issue raised in this debate is whether the
various passages in Plato's Laws in which homosexual congress is
discussed evince the presence of a pre-Christian, extra-biblical civic
antipathy toward the practice. On the face of it, the answer is clearly
positive: In two of the three passages where the practice is explicitly
mentioned, the dialogue's protagonist, an unidentified traveler
hailing from Athens, describes sodomy as unnatural;" in the third, he
legally proscribes its practice.'
For John Finnis, this characterization constitutes a definitive case
against sodomitic congress. So clear in fact do these passages in the
Laws appear to Finnis that he is impelled to make quite bold claims
about Plato's general views in this regard. In his affidavit to the
court, Finnis exults in the similarity of these condemnations to later
Christian teachings concerning sexual morality. After citing these
passages26 to argue that "the same Plato who in his Symposium wrote
a famous celebration of romantic and spiritual man-boy erotic
relationships also made very clear that all forms of sexual conduct
outside heterosexual marriage are shameful, wrongful and
harmful,"" he proceeds to note that distinguished Plato scholars
have remarked, with much regret, on the similarity of these
condemnations to the views of Pope John Paul II: "Some recent
scholars (overlooking Christianity's Jewish roots and own indigenous
resources) go so far as to attribute Christian sexual morality to the
influence of Plato, so thorough is the convergence on matters of
sexual conduct.
28
His claims are even more aggressive in his two post-trial articles,
24. See PLATO, supra note 3, at 636b-c, 836c.
25. See id. at 838e.
26. See Finnis Affidavit, supra note 5, 1 37 ("I refer to PLATO, THE LAWS I, 636C, VIII,
836B-D, 837B-C, 838E, 840D-841E.").
27. Id.
28. Id. 1 37. One of these scholars, A.W. Price, writes:
Thus Plato's evolving attitude towards sexuality soon takes on nuances beyond an
undiscriminating philosophical distaste for physical indulgence. It is likely that in his
eventual estimation and even imposition of parenthood he frees himself, without
hypocrisy, from his own involuntary repugnance (which PHAEDRUS 250e3-5 fleetingly
betray); if so, he has achieved the best of victories, that over oneself (LAWS 1.626e2-3).
However, to the extent that Plato is linked to John Paul II by a chain of influence, his
heroism has cost others dear. Most of us must wish that his sexual prohibitions had never
escaped from utopia; and yet, however questionable his grounding of them may be, in
detail or in general, its integrity and originality invite from us all a detached curiosity and
respect.
A.W. PRICE, LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 234-35 (1989). For Finnis's
detailed comments on Price's observation, see Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," supra
note 7, at 22, and "Shameless Acts," supra note 7, at 29.
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where he points out that the various scholarly authorities to whom
Nussbaum appeals "all concur in using the terms 'unnatural' or
'contrary to nature' to translate para phusin as predicated on
homosexual acts in Laws" and that "[all judge that para phusin, as
used by Plato in the Laws, must be understood as the core of a very
firm and unqualified condemnation of homosexual conduct." 9 He
continues:
Like even Halperin and Winkler... , Dover, Price, and...
Vlastos all judge that to know or tell Plato's views on the
morality, the immorality, of all such non-marital conduct as
homosexual sex acts, one need go no further than these
unmistakably clear passages in the Laws, texts with which every
other text of Plato can readily be seen to be consistent. 30
Most amazingly, by extrapolating from this negative argument
(sodomy is unnatural and thus immoral), Finnis is able to find in the
Laws a positive defense of the intrinsic goodness and desirability of
marriage. "At the heart of the Platonic-Aristotelian and later ancient
philosophical rejections of all homosexual conduct," Finnis declares
in his affidavit, "are three fundamental theses."' 3' First: "The
commitment of a man and women to each other in the sexual union
of marriage is intrinsically good and reasonable, and is incompatible
with sexual relations outside marriage. '"32 Second: "Homosexual acts
are radically and peculiarly non-marital, and for that reason
unnatural and unreasonable." Third: "Furthermore, according
especially to Plato, homosexual acts have a special similarity to
solitary masturbation, which is manifestly unworthy of the human
being and immoral. '33 As evidence for these claims, Finnis quotes
and comments on two (previously cited) passages from the Laws. He
first notes Plato's characterization at 636c of the pleasures of
heterosexual intercourse as "due to nature" and the pleasures of
homosexual intercourse as "contrary to nature." "'[U]niting for
procreation,"' Finnis explains, "in fact refers to marital
intercourse." 34 This "is made clear," he suggests, "in a later passage
in the same work, where Plato's mouthpiece sums up his intervening
29. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 7, at 23. See also Finnis,
"Shameless Acts," supra note 7, at 29.
30. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," supra note 7, at 23, and "Shameless
Acts," supra note 7, at 29.
31. Finnis Affidavit, supra note 5, 41. See also Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation," supra note 7, at 25.
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commendation of marital intercourse and condemnation of extra-
marital sexual activity by proposing two quasi-alternative laws to
govern sexual conduct in the as-near-as-can-be-ideal state."35 After
quoting the final (and confusing) adultery laws at 841c-e, Finnis con-
cludes: "Plato's last word on sex thus makes explicit the rationale for
what Socrates (while homoerotically playing with fire) implicitly
taught by his actual conduct: sexual conduct is consistent with human
integrity only in marriage."36
In response to John Finnis's assertion of the Laws' antipathy
toward homosexuality and praise of conjugal fidelity, Martha
Nussbaum assiduously seeks to demonstrate this dialogue's profound
neutrality toward both. Plato's animus, she argues, is directed toward
neither the natural nor the unnatural character of any particular
form of sexual intercourse, but, rather, the immoderation with which
the sexual actor proceeds. The sexual crime to be found in the Laws,
she asserts, is incontinence, not sodomy.
Of Nussbaum's various concerns, the first of these-to
demonstrate that John Finnis and Robert George "are simply wrong
in claiming that classical philosophy, particularly the works of Plato
and Aristotle, condemn gay and lesbian relationships as
immoral" 37-is most directly addressed in the documents emanating
from the trial itself. Her basic claim, advanced in her oral testimony
to the court on October 15, was that Finnis misinterpreted 636c on
account of his reliance on R.G. Bury's prudish and outdated (1926)
translation of the Laws.' As Nussbaum asserts: Because "there was a
great deal of shame and embarrassment about homosexuality in the
British and American cultures.., morally neutral phrases such as
'those who first venture to do this,' namely, have same-sex relations,
are translated 'those who were first guilty of such abominations.' ' 9
After Robert George pointed out in his testimony that all other
readily accessible major translations of the work, both dated and
recent, translate the word in question with similarly negative
renditions, ' Nussbaum invoked the definition supplied by "Liddle
[sic], Scott, - [sic] Lexicon of the Ancient Greek Language [sic],
the authoritative dictionary relied on by all scholars in the area," to
argue for a more neutral translation of tolmgma: "an adventure,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 2.
38. See Nussbaum Testimony, supra note 5, at 11.
39. Id.
40. See George Testimony, supra note 5, at 1320 ("When I checked various translations, I
found that it was sometimes translated as shameful acts, sometimes translated as crimes,
sometimes as offences, sometimes as outrages.").
Clark
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enterprise, deed of daring."41 As she later elaborates: "I have chosen
the more neutral 'venture,' since it seems to me that in the context
Plato is being neutral, and since it seems best not to read in a positive
connotation if one is not absolutely certain."42
Nussbaum then proceeds to address one of Finnis's other major
assertions: that sodomy is unnatural and hence shameful. To
accomplish this, she again suggests that Finnis makes tendentious use
of an outdated translation. Whereas Finnis finds a moral stigma in
Plato's use of the words "para phusin," which Bury translates as
"contrary to nature," 3 Nussbaum finds merely a mild injunction to
multiply and replenish the earth. Commenting on the second of the
two passages' in which the Stranger characterizes homosexual
congress as unnatural, Nussbaum rebuts Finnis's assertion that the
term is pejorative by arguing that Plato is merely addressing the issue
of the citizens' fecundity:
What does the passage argue? Plato is facing problems of
populating a new colony; here as often in the ancient world,
underpopulation is a pressing problem, and he is devising
legislation to deal with that problem.... He argues that a
general prohibition on sex outside marriage will be "conducive
to birth," and a toleration of sex outside marriage will be
"contrary to birth." Thus the terms tendentiously translated
"according to nature" and "unnatural" or "contrary to nature"
actually refer... to "birth" and not "nature" in any normative
moral sense. The ambiguity of the word phusis is noted already
in Aristotle's Physics, and can be documented from a wide
41. Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 1 10. Nussbaum's reliance here on "Liddle [sic],
Scott, - [sic] Lexicon of the Ancient Greek Language [sic]" to substantiate her claim was
later subjected to vigorous attack (charges of perjury, even) by both Finnis and George. On
October 27, Finnis submitted an addendum to his rebuttal affidavit to the court in which he
pointed out that the lexicon Nussbaum invoked in her affidavit was not actually "the
authoritative dictionary relied on by all scholars in this area," but, rather, a long-superseded
edition of LIDDELL, SCOTT AND JONES, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON. Finnis Addendum to
Rebuttal Affidavit, supra note 5, 5. He adduced this from the fact that both the 1940 and
1968 versions of this work have as their definition for tolmema the entry "adventure,
enterprise, daring or shameless act." Id. Only if one goes back to the 1897 edition can one find
an entry that does not include the words "shameless act." Id. Finnis elaborated on these
charges in a subsequent article, "Shameless Acts," supra note 7, at 24-29. Nussbaum replied in
Platonic Love, supra note 7, at 1531-37, 1614-1622, in which she argued for the general
unreliability of lexica for resolving interpretive issues. Not satisfied with her response, George
reiterated Finnis's charges in another article, "Shameless Acts" Revisited, supra note 7, at 32-
37. For an even-handed synopsis of these charges and countercharges, see Mendelsohn, supra
note 11. For a more partisan account, see Gerard V. Bradley, In the Case of Martha Nussbaum,
44 FIRST THINGS 11 (1994).
42. Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 17. Elaboration on the translation issue can also
be found in paragraph 16.
43. PLATO, supra note 22, at 636c.
44. Id. at 838e.
[Vol. 12:1
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Her point, namely, that the derivation of "what ought to be" from
"what is" is anything but straightforward, is elaborated in the
subsequent paragraph:
Furthermore, even if we were to... argue that the passage did
hold that same-sex relations are "contrary to nature," rather
than, as I would argue, "contrary to birth," it makes no moral
argument against those acts. Since the fifth century B.C. the
Greeks debated about the relative merits of untutored nature
and human invention, and they were as well aware as J.S. Mill
("On Nature") that an appeal to nature in the sense of "the way
things are without human intervention" doesn't give any
argument for their being good.'
While Finnis might well be able to establish his claim that sodomy
is immoral because it is "contrary to nature," Nussbaum here
challenges him to elaborate: "We would need a further argument,
since ignorance and disease and all sorts of bad things are 'natural' in
some sense."
47
Aside from the facile projection of the naturalistic fallacy onto
Plato, Finnis's major mistake, Nussbaum argues further, is his
inability to recognize that Plato's agenda in the Laws is neither the
proscription of homosexual congress nor the promotion of faithful
conjugal felicity, but, rather, a deep abhorrence of excessive
indulgence in corporeal gratification in any form. In his eagerness to
find in the Laws both a natural law condemnation of sodomy and a
defense of marriage, Finnis fails to note that this dialogue's sexual
regulations are actually quite even-handed in their condemnation of
all sexual excess, both homosexual and heterosexual.
Nussbaum first makes this case in her affidavit, where she suggests
that the problem with homosexuality and adultery is that their
sterility is not conducive to the city's growth:
So all that is being said here is, if one wants to increase the
population one might well try to do this through a prohibition
on extramarital sex. This says nothing at all about sexual acts
among non-married people-the entire context is one in which
Plato is legislating for the conduct of marriage and the married,
and has no bearing on the unmarried. Nor does homosexuality
get any condemnation that adultery does not also get.
45. Nussbaum Affidavit, supra note 5, 54.
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Furthermore, no special moral praise is given to marriage or
married sex; the concern is entirely with populating the new
colony.'
She shifts her tack somewhat in her subsequent article in the
Virginia Law Review, in which she claims that these non-marital
sexual practices are condemned on account of their particularly
sensual character. While recognizing that it "is sometimes thought
that in the Laws Plato offers a general condemnation of homosexual
relations in a way that singles them out for special moral blame," she
proceeds to argue that "Plato's overall worry is... about bodily
pleasure generally and its ability to take over the personality,
disrupting reason." 9 The basic argument, upon which she expounds
in an appendix to the article, is the following:
Insofar as Plato devotes particular attention to homosexual
relations, it is because he thinks they are especially powerful
sources of passionate stimulation, not because they are thought
to be especially depraved or shameful. The criticism of those
who indulge in the active role is that they are intemperate and
overindulgent, not that they are wicked. °
As she concludes: "In general, Plato is among the philosophers I
consider most suspicious about the bodily appetites."51 In a lengthy
appendix to an already quite lengthy article, Nussbaum seeks to
present more ample textual evidence for this claim."
In a summary as brief as the one just presented, one cannot hope
to do full justice to the arguments advanced by the various
disputants. As those familiar with this case well know, the documents
are voluminous, the assertions manifold, and the tone acrimonious.
Sifting, sorting, and weighing the debate's various arguments has
been taxing indeed. The complexity of this debate notwithstanding, I
am confident that I have here conveyed an accurate and essential
outline of their disagreement. For Finnis, the Laws' castigation of
homosexual intercourse as "contrary to nature" clearly bespeaks
Plato's desire to limit sexual relations to the confines of marriage.
For Nussbaum, conversely, it makes no sense to speak of
"unnatural" sexual intercourse: The sexual crimes proscribed by
Plato's Laws lie not in one's choice of partner but in the excessive
indulgence in any form of sexual experience.
48. Id. 54.
49. Nussbaum, Platonic Love, supra note 7, at 1579.
50. Id. at 1580.
51. Id. at 1581.
52. See id. app. 3 at 1623-39.
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III. WHAT DOES PLATO SAY ABOUT SODOMY?
In light of the disagreement concerning sexuality in the Laws, the
questions to ask, I believe, are the following. The first is necessarily
narrow: Is Plato's use of the term "contrary to nature" (para phusin)
at 636c a pejorative characterization of homosexual sodomy? Several
broader questions flow from the answer to the first. What is the
moral status, in the context of the entire dialogue, of "unnatural"
acts? What is this dialogue's view regarding male sexual desire? Is
the practice of homosexual congress any worse than the many other
varieties of non-marital sexual acts? What legitimate interest does
the city have in regulating human sexual activity? Finally, what
contribution to our vexed debates concerning (homo)sexuality, the
family, and the state could an honest and careful reading of the Laws
actually make? Let us address each of these questions in turn.
In their various depositions, testimonies, affidavits, and post-trial
articles, Nussbaum and Finnis vigorously argued, as I have
elaborated above, about the latter's assertion that Plato character-
ized homosexual intercourse with the pejorative terms "contrary to
nature" (para phusin) and "enormities" (tolmema). Key to both
parties' strategies was ascertaining the precise meaning of these
words; to this end they primarily invoked lexica (old and new),
alternative translations, and computer-generated word counts. To a
lesser extent, they also sought to highlight (or diminish) the
syntactical ambiguities and textual flaws in the dialogue's various
manuscripts. While this debate presented many curious issues, it
suffered, regrettably, from the intellectual myopia with which
scholars, especially those who labor with old and complicated texts,
are often impaired: They failed to situate their "translations" of
these words within either the immediate context of the passage or
the broader context of the dialogue as a whole, or did so in a
disingenuous manner. Since a slightly more far-sighted perspective is
necessary to understand this passage, allow me to attempt to sketch
the dialogical context into which Plato thrust these potentially
charged words.
One of the most central issues addressed in the Laws is the
problem of human pleasure. Over the course of this very lengthy
dialogue, the protagonist, a certain unidentified Athenian stranger
traveling in Krete, insistently asks the following pertinent questions:
What is the relationship of bodily pleasure to human nature? What
kind and degree of pleasure is optimal? Finally, to what sort of
regulation, both personal and political, should it be subject? While
the Athenian is eager to engage in an extended discussion of these
questions, particularly the possibility that the moderate enjoyment of
Clark
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pleasure-the drinking of wine is his flagship example-is morally
preferable to either abstention or excess, he knows that the character
of his two interlocutors, a Spartan and a Kretan, inclines them to
resist such talk. 3
This sort of conundrum is, of course, a structural element in every
Platonic dialogue. The long-winded protagonist (usually Socrates,
but occasionally another) engages one or more interlocutors in a
vigorous debate concerning some topic or another. The substance of
these discussions is often weighty, and on occasion the reader might
even walk away with some formulaic expression of what "Plato
thinks" about such and such a matter. More interesting, at least for
seasoned readers of these dialogues, is not so much the doctrine one
might discern, but the exercise of watching the Socratic protagonist
wrestle with his various interlocutors, each of whom appears to us as
a manifestation of a certain sort of human soul. (The Republic is, in
this respect, exemplary: While the reader might well claim to have
learned much about the layout of the "just city" upon coming to the
end of Plato's first articulation of a "city in speech,"' the real
excitement comes from watching the responses of the youthful
interlocutors to Socrates' attacks on their various conceits.)
In this respect, the Laws conforms well to the Platonic model. Like
the Republic, the work it follows, and to a certain extent corrects, the
Laws provides us with two other instantiations of the human spirit.
The more interesting of the two is Kleinias, an aged statesman from
Knossos, the predominant city on the isle of Krete, who has been
entrusted by the city elders with the foundation of a colony. A pious
man, Kleinias has undertaken a pilgrimage from Knossos up to the
mountain-top sanctuary of Zeus, where he hopes, we presume, to
obtain revelatory guidance concerning the laws for his colony.
Accompanying him on his walk is Megillus, an elderly Spartan
with extensive military experience, who appears to be quite
knowledgeable about the details of Kleinias' colony. Emigrants from
other cities on the Peloponnesian peninsula will also settle in this
city.5
These men are, as readers of the dialogue soon discover, quite
different. Kleinias has traveled more widely, read more curiously,
and, it would appear, thought more deeply about the whole range of
53. See PLATO, supra note 3, at Books I and II. For an extended discussion of the Laws'
treatment of these and other questions, see RANDALL BALDWIN CLARK, THE LAW MOST
BEAUTIFUL AND BEST: MEDICAL ARGUMENT AND MAGICAL RHETORIC IN PLATO'S LAWS
(Rowman & Littlefield - Lexington Books, forthcoming 2001).
54. PLATO, REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., Basic Books 1991).
55. For a more extensive comparison of the protagonists and interlocutors of these two
Platonic dialogues, see CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter 1.
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issues entailed in the foundation and nurture of a healthy city. He is
quite capable of following, step-by-step, as the Athenian leads him in
a lengthy and complicated mountain-side conversation. Megillus,
however, appears to be less interested in entertaining this Athenian's
unusual ideas. In any event, we don't know much about what he
actually thinks, as he says very little over the course of this extremely
lengthy dialogue.
In spite of their various differences, there is one manner in which
they are quite similar: They are both products of the abstemious
Dorian culture, one that prides itself on the strict avoidance of all
pleasurable activities, including intoxication. In this respect, they are
both resistant to the Athenian's advances. Drinking, one of the most
accessible and enjoyable of human activities, would be the perfect
starting-point for the Stranger's discussion of the problem and
promise of pleasure, but as we ourselves can see in the opening pages
of the dialogue, these two prove themselves resistant to the
Stranger's efforts to raise these issues. Such a discussion would, in
fact, constitute a rather substantial criticism of the traditional Dorian
lawgivers.56
How, then, does the Stranger seek to initiate this titillating, if not
seditious, discussion of the virtue-inducing power of wine? As odd as
it might appear, he does so by provoking a fight with his
interlocutors. While it is a common strategy to win debates by
vigorously demonstrating the weaknesses in your opponent's
position, such an approach runs the risk of stiffening his resistance.
The Athenian seems to be aware of this psychological truth. Instead
of launching into a head-on attack on the crabbed character of the
Dorian law (an approach that had already raised his companions'
hackles), he seeks now to situate himself as a patriotic defender of
his native city's own practice of symposia. In the positive role of
advocate rather than the negative role of critic, the Athenian better
situates himself to advance his subversive argument. By provoking,
exacerbating, and then conciliating a nasty little spat, the Stranger
puts himself in a stronger position to make the argument that really
matters to him.7
So how does this tiff proceed? It starts, as does many a playground
scuffle, with the charge that the other party engages in frightful
sexual practices and then covers them up with other moral crimes. In
this case, the Athenian specifically accuses the Dorians of taking
56. See, e.g., PLATO, supra note 3, at 628e, 630d. See also CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter
6.
57. For an elaboration on this rhetorical strategy, see Thomas Pangle, Interpretive Essay, in
PLATO, LAWS, supra note 3, at 393-96.
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hypocritical delight in the unnatural practice of sodomy and then
covering up their vice with a blasphemous lie concerning the gods.
The Dorians initially resisted the Athenian Stranger's suggestion
that the lawgiver should encourage the virtue of moderation by
teaching his subjects to enjoy-but resist the excesses of-
pleasurable activities; they had, after all, repeatedly asserted that the
Dorian laws do not tolerate the slightest indulgence in corporeal
pleasures. In response to these assertions, the Athenian points out
that the practice of gymnastics, which his interlocutors had
specifically characterized as conducive to the pleasure-denying virtue
of courage, also leads to the unnatural vice of sodomy. "There is an
ancient law," the Stranger explains, "concerning sexual pleasures not
only of humans but of beasts, a law laid down even in nature, which
this practice seems to have corrupted.""8 The Athenian elaborates
this claim with another assertion: Sexual pleasure comes in two
forms, procreative natural heterosexual congress and unnatural
homosexual union. Natural: "It should be understood that the
pleasure is given according to nature, it seems, when the female
unites with the nature of males for procreation."59 Unnatural: "Males
coming together with males, and females with females, seems against
nature."' Important to note, however, is that the Athenian regards
both forms of genital intercourse, natural and unnatural, as
inherently pleasurable. As the Stranger declares, "the daring of
those who first did it seems to have arisen from a lack of self-
restraint with regard to pleasure."'" The problem with this Dorian
practice, the Athenian suggests, is thus two-fold: Not only is it
"unnatural," it is also excessive.
The problem with one vice, the Athenian attack continues, is that
it leads to others. Because the Dorian law, as interpreted by even its
most thoughtful adherents, categorically condemns the pursuit of
pleasure, Kleinias' forefathers-men who had spent their time ogling
boys at the gymnasia-had to find a way to justify their hypocrisy.
This they did with their blasphemous ascription of the rape of Gany-
mede to Zeus: "But the fact is, we all accuse the Cretans of being the
originators of the myth of Ganymede."62 According to this story,
even the greatest of the gods enjoyed the company of beautiful
young men: Ganymede, "who was the loveliest born of the race of
mortals," was abducted "to be Zeus' wine-pourer, / for the sake of
58. PLATO, supra note 3, at 636b. All passages from the Laws hereafter quoted (unless
otherwise noted) are taken from Professor Pangle's translation.
59. Id. at 636c.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 636d.
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his beauty."'63 The Athenian pulls no punches with his final, trenchant
charge: "Since their laws were believed to have come from Zeus,
they added this myth about Zeus so that they could be following the
god as they continued to reap the enjoyments of this pleasure. '
Translate para phusin and tolmma however you will, the gist of the
Athenian's attack on his interlocutors is unmistakable: Perverts,
weaklings, hypocrites, blasphemers!
Megillus is not insensible to the abusive character of the
Athenian's comments. After reiterating his assertion that "the
lawgiver in Lacedaimon seems to have done what's correct when he
ordered fleeing from pleasures,"'65 Megillus engages in an equally
patriotic ad hominem retort: You Athenians are a bunch of
drunkards!
Never would you see in fields or towns under Spartan
supervision any drinking parties or any of the stuff that goes
with them, which has such power to incite men to every sort of
pleasure. There isn't a one of us who wouldn't immediately
inflict the gravest punishment when he encountered one of
those drunken revelers, and the Dionysia wouldn't afford an
excuse that would protect him, if he were doing the sorts of
things I saw them do in the carts once among your people. Why,
in Tarentum among our colonists I witnessed the whole city
drunk at a Dionysia! That kind of thing just doesn't exist among
US.6
The Athenian then reciprocates by reminding Megillus of the
somewhat less-than-irreproachable character of the Spartan ladies.67
Lacedaimonian stranger, all such things are praiseworthy, where
there is endurance; where that is loosened, they do become
pretty stupid. Perhaps someone from our side might defend
himself by taking you up, and pointing to the looseness of your
women.
68
When the Athenian again tries to raise the issue of the proper sort of
63. HOMER, ILIAD XX.232-34 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1962).
64. PLATO, supra note 3, at 636d.
65. Id. at 636e.
66. Id. at 637a-b.
67. The Athenian's accusation is not baseless. This charge is echoed in the works of poets
as diverse as Homer and Euripides. The former, of course, recorded in detail the war caused by
the adulterous Helen, wife of Menelaus, King of Sparta; with somewhat greater pith, the latter
has one of his characters declare: "Not even if she wanted to could a Spartan girl be chaste.
They leave their houses in the company of young men, with bare thighs and loosened tunics,
and in a fashion I cannot stand they share the same running tracks and wrestling places with
them." EURIPIDES, ANDROMACHE 597-600 (David Kovacs ed. & trans., Loeb Classical
Library 1995).
68. PLATO, supra note 3, at 637b-c.
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wine-drinking ("So let's speak at greater length about the whole
subject of intoxication"'69) and points to the many warlike races-
Scythians, Persians, Carthaginians, Celts, Iberians, and Thracians-
that engage in some version of the practice, Megillus belligerently
replies: "But, 0 best of men, we do put all these peoples to flight
when we take up our arms."7 The bloodied contour of this
combative conversation is unmistakable: Faggot, souse, bastard,
wimp! This is hardly an exchange best rendered by translation into
morally "neutral" English.
At this point, the Stranger begins a strategic retreat from his
attack. Rather than respond to Megillus' bombastic provocation, the
Athenian asks him to consider the possibility that drinking (like the
various other practices with which they have respectively charged
each other) might well be praiseworthy, if properly governed. As he
declares to Megillus: "Having heard only this much about the subject
of drunkenness, some of us are immediately blaming it and others
are praising it-both absurdly."7 Instead of engaging in this
debilitating battle ("I don't think it makes sense for us to go through
each of the other legal customs this way"72), he proposes that they
"go through this very custom, drunkenness"73 with the broad-
mindedness and civility that might serve as a model for the entire
day's inquiry. Megillus' resistance softens and the Stranger proceeds
with his advocacy of well-governed drunkenness, a subject that will
occupy them until the end of the second book.
Our brief analysis of the spat between the Athenian Stranger and
Megillus, his Spartan interlocutor, should equip us to adjudicate
another: that between John Finnis and Martha Nussbaum over the
dialogue's assessment of homosexual congress. While Finnis and
Nussbaum vigorously quibbled over the precise translation of the
terms para phusin and tolm46ma at 636b-c, a modest effort to
understand their context unmistakably reveals that the Athenian's
unflattering characterization of sodomitic congress is part of a
deliberate (and successful) campaign to rile his interlocutors.
Nussbaum should not be the least bit surprised that almost all
published translations of the Laws render these expressions,
respectively, with the disparaging terms "contrary to nature" and
"enormities." The English is tendentious precisely because the
Greek is also.
69. Id. at 637d.
70. Id. at 638a.
71. Id. at 638d.
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IV. UNNATURAL ACTS: A SECOND GLANCE
With Plato, however, few things are as simple as they first appear.
As any semi-sentient reader well knows, his sparkling works are
suffused with an ironic complexity comprehensible only to those who
are willing to pay careful attention to the complete dialectical
structure (at the very least) of any given Platonic dialogue.
Superficial readings of his work, such as the one I have just
presented, provide insights which are just that: superficial.
Particularly fraught with complexity is this dialogue's invocation of
the term "nature." Finnis understands, quite correctly, that Plato
attacks the Dorian practice of sodomy as "contrary to nature" at
636b-c of the Laws. Nussbaum, perhaps suspecting that her
interpretation of this passage is indefensible, insists that this
dialogue's invocation of "nature" is so diffuse as to be un-
illuminating. While Finnis is as correct in his interpretation of 636b-c
as Nussbaum is wrong, Finnis should not gloat, nor Nussbaum evade,
for a somewhat more careful examination of the Athenian Stranger's
invocation of nature in this dialogue will deflate both of their claims.
The concept of "nature" is a tremendously important issue in the
Laws. From the beginning to the end of this very lengthy dialogue,
Plato forces his reader to ask himself two inescapable questions:
What would "natural" politics look like and are such desirable?
While I fear that these questions could not adequately be addressed
by even a lengthy and erudite book,74 to comprehend the respective
inadequacies of Finnis's and Nussbaum's interpretations of 636b-c it
would be useful to understand precisely how Plato raises this issue
and then problematizes it, thus setting the stage for the dialogue's
consideration thereof.
The importance of this issue is suggested by its exceedingly early
occurrence in the dialogue. In the very first sentence, the Athenian
Stranger asks his interlocutors whether it is "a god or some human
being, strangers, who is given the credit for laying down your laws?"75
He receives two contradictory responses. The initial response comes
from Kleinias, the elderly Knossian statesman who has been
entrusted with chief responsibility for founding a new Kretan colony,
who reports the traditional Dorian belief that the law has a divine
origin: It comes from a "god, stranger, a god-to say what is at any
rate the most just thing. 76 Kleinias' suggestion that man finds law by
looking to the heavens is underscored by the destination of this
74. For a modest attempt at such, see CLARK, supra note 53.
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prospective lawgiver's trek-the mountain-top cave sanctuary of
Zeus.
On the other hand, even as Kleinias avers by deed, if not also by
word, that the laws have a divine origin, his response to the
Stranger's next question suggests that their source may be rather
more mundane. When the Stranger asks why these divine laws
ordain common meals, gymnastic training, and archery, Kleinias
seeks to demonstrate how "all of these practices of ours exist with a
view to war."'77 He first explains that the Kretans deploy lightly
armored infantry archers in warfare because the mountainous
"nature" (phusis) of the Kretan terrain will not permit the use of
more heavily armored cavalry, as is customary in Thessaly, where the
flat plains are conducive to equestrian battle. Kleinias next argues
that the civilian practice of common meals is derived from the fact
"that all men, when on a military campaign, are compelled
(anankazontai) by the business to eat together during this time in
order to keep up their guard."" He concludes his response with an
assertion that peacetime laws should replicate those of war because
"for everyone throughout the whole of life an endless war exists
against all cities."79 For this reason, "the lawgiver of the Cretans
established all our customs, public and private, with a view to war,
and... he handed down the laws to be guarded according to these
principles."'
Let us consider more carefully some of the assumptions and
implications of this remarkable defense of Kretan law. While
Kleinias initially insisted that Kretan laws come from god rather than
man, his answer to the Stranger's next question shows Kretan law (or
at least his understanding thereof) to be thoroughly earthbound. All
customs, public and private, are ordained for the sake of success in
war-and war is pursued to acquire and retain bodily goods, not the
least of which is corporeal self-preservation. It is worthy of note that
in his response Kleinias introduces into the dialogue here two words,
phusis (nature) and ananke (necessity or compulsion), which are of
profound significance both in pre-Socratic philosophy and in this
dialogue. One of the major achievements of the pre-Socratic
philosophers was a concept of "nature," which they juxtaposed to
"law" or "convention" (nomos) and to "art" (techn6). Nature,
because it is ever-lasting and all-powerful, forms the essential
context in which all human activity occurs. Crassly put, what nature
77. Id. at 625d-e.
78. Id. at 625e.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 626a-b.
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demands, man must fulfill. This antithesis was a powerful tool in the
hands of certain Sophists, who invoked the primacy of nature to
support their rejection of the traditional practices of Greek society.
With his invocation of "nature" and "necessity" in his defense of the
Kretan law, Kleinias thus reveals himself an unlikely heir to this
Sophistic tradition.
But Kleinias' appeal to necessity and nature maintains a certain
pre-philosophic naivet6. Unlike these Sophists, who were quick to
apprehend the antithetical quality of the relationship between nature
and convention, for Kleinias there is no such tension. Kretan law
springs up, without intermediation, from that island's rocky soil.
Many Sophists saw the contrast between nature and convention;
exercising their option, they accepted the former. Kleinias accepts
nature without realizing that he has a choice. Kleinias' obliviousness
to the tension between the natural and the conventional can best be
seen in what he does not say in his discussion of archery and common
meals. Not mentioned in his defense of archery is the fact that great
shame is associated with this form of warfare. Instead of fighting at
close quarters, where the combatants reciprocally expose themselves
to the risk of injury, the Kretans kill their enemies from a distance
with arrows.' Kleinias speaks of this cowardly practice in a matter-
of-fact way: The Kretan countryside is mountainous, so the Kretans
deploy lightly armored infantry archers, but the land surrounding
Thessaly is flat, so the Thessalians fight on horseback. His argument
is not one that your run-of-the-mill Sophistic relativist would make,
namely, that diversity in customs is indicative only of diversity in
preference. He argues, rather, that diversity in human customs, to
the extent it exists, is dictated by diversity in nature.
Kleinias' explanation of the origin of common meals is similarly
oblivious to the ignominy of this practice. Refined and leisured
people dine in the relaxation of their own homes, reclining on soft
couches, drinking wine in the company of family, friends, and well-
born strangers. Wartime nutrition resembles, rather, swillish feeding
of a particularly brutish sort. If attacked while eating, the soldier
must spring from his haunches, replace his armor-his helmet still
containing, likely, the remainder of his meal -and engage the enemy
in a struggle for his very life. Like his discussion of archery, Kleinias'
explanation of the origin of their common meals reveals a
straightforward matter-of-factness. The practice of taking meals in
81. See also id. at 706c-d. Here, the Stranger's contempt for such mobile combat prompts
him to express his gratitude that the Knossian colony is not endowed with a good harbor. On
the Greeks' contempt for the cowardice of the bowman, see Diomedes' reproach to
Alexandros after the latter shot an arrow at him from behind a column. See HOMER, supra
note 63, at XI.385-95.
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common, like archery, arose from the necessities of warfare. For
Kleinias, these necessities are so compelling that he has difficulty
imagining that the Kretans would want to fight or eat in any other
manner.
While Kleinias appears to be a character of sound intellectual
powers compared with the Platonic interlocutors whom Socrates
frequently leads around like ring-nosed bull calves, he reveals
himself, upon probing, to be insufficiently reflective. His intellectual
incoherence can best be seen in his confusion concerning the origin
of law. To the Stranger's first question, Kleinias asserts that the law
comes from "a god, stranger, a god." Nonetheless, when he tries to
give a detailed explanation of this divine law, it becomes apparent
that the law is oblivious to the virtues of the soul. The Kretan law,
like the human bodies it governs, is thoroughly enslaved to the
corporeal necessities of nature. Kleinias does not recognize that a
god-if a divinity actually is the source of Kretan law-would
cultivate the higher virtues of the soul rather than the lower ones of
the body. Kleinias is, to be sure, an amazingly intelligent and quick-
witted interlocutor, as can be seen in the vigor with which he follows
the Stranger's argument. Nonetheless, as the dialogue begins, he is as
yet unaware of the various ways in which the divine and the natural,
the soul and the body, can be at odds with each other.
The Athenian Stranger's most evident rhetorical objective in this
dialogue is to teach Kleinias, a man who will shortly give laws to a
new colony, to free himself and his city from the necessities of
nature. In order to do so, the Stranger must first make him aware of
the tensions between the soulful and the natural. He must then
persuade Kleinias to promulgate laws that will elevate the former
over the latter. They will not be like the Kretan laws, which slavishly
conform to the perceived necessities of the body. In short, the
Athenian desires to open up the law to the influence of Socratic
philosophy.
The Athenian, however, does not engage in a frontal assault. As
part of his effort to forge tempered truth from the molten opinions
of the many, this Platonic philosopher starts with his Dorian
interlocutor's unphilosophic practices and the base desires from
which they originate, then seeks to derive legislation ultimately more
conducive to the philosophic virtues of the soul than the earth-bound
scrambling codified by the necessitous Dorian law. Over the course
of this dialogue, the Athenian systematically takes up, examines,
critiques, and modifies many of the practices regulated by the Dorian
law; in each instance, he takes a custom derived from private desire
and subtly transforms it into a public good. While the Stranger's
adventures in philosophic legislative rejuvenation touch upon almost
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every aspect of his interlocutors' laws, in no area are his efforts more
visible than in his transformation of laws governing three of the
basest human desires: those for food, drink, and sex.' Because the
issue at hand is precisely Plato's view of homoerotic desire and the
family, let us take a careful look at the Athenian's understanding of
both the nature of erotic desire and the soulful elevations to which
he subjects it.
V. PROMISCUITY AND NARCISSISM:
WHICH IS THE GREATER PROBLEM?
Rather baldly stated, the Athenian Stranger's view of male sexual
desire is that men are both sexually promiscuous and romantically
narcissistic. Men, especially those still young, seek out frequent
opportunities for sexual intercourse, preferably with partners very
much like themselves, be it in terms of class, disposition, kinship, or
gender.
The first of these claims, that the Athenian Stranger views male
sexuality as fundamentally promiscuous, is unremarkable, both
textually and ontologically. Not only does the Laws provide ample
illustration of youthful remonstrances at the attempt of the elderly to
drive adolescent sexual desire into the confines of lawful
matrimony,' few (with perhaps the exception of our postmodern
brethren) would seriously gainsay the biological basis of the seven-
year itch.
The second of these claims, that Plato here portrays sexual desire
as narcissistic, is less immediately apparent. Modern theorists of
evolutionary psychology would not be at all surprised by Plato's
assertion that the human male is not exactly hard-wired for conjugal
fidelity; his suggestion, however, that men by nature prefer the
strokings of their sisters and favors of their fellows over those
of their wives would strike many, at the very least, as quite
questionable.
Nonetheless, over the course of this weird dialogue Plato does
indeed paint a portrait of youthful male sexuality that is highly
suggestive of this perspective. Although his explicit declarations of
such are somewhat oracular ("it is according to nature that everyone
always be somehow attracted to what is most similar to himself"'),
as the Stranger seeks to woo coltish young men into the institution of
marriage he provides the reader with multiple and colorful examples
82. See CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapters 4, 7.
83. See id. at Chapter 1.
84. PLATO, supra note 3, at 773b.
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of the promiscuous and narcissistic nature of male erotic desire.
One of the most remarkable features of the debate between
Nussbaum and Finnis over the relationship between homosexuality
and marriage in the Laws is their complete silence on many of the
passages in which the Athenian Stranger addresses the issue of
marriage itself. In addition to the omnibus legislation in Book VIII
(over which Finnis and Nussbaum vigorously strove) proscribing the
practices of masturbation, adultery, and homosexual intercourse,85
the Athenian pays a great deal of attention elsewhere to the
realization of the legislator's desire that young men and women form
the stable and loving marriages necessary for the rearing of healthy
and well-rounded children. Not only will his laws allow Magnesia's
youth to satisfy their prurient curiosity concerning potential mates'
anatomical (im)perfections (a staple of the city's various religious
festivals is youthful dancing sans toga),' the Athenian provides the
city's lusty young men with more than ample guidance on the moral
and economic criteria they should consider in their selection of a
mate. His eagerness to offer such guidance can be discerned in the
fact that he sees fit to offer, alongside many lines of advisory dicta,
not one but two formal marriage laws, in which he exhorts young
men to assume the onerous burdens of marriage and fatherhood.
A cursory examination of the first of these two laws is suggestive
of the challenge facing the lawgiver. Most striking is its location. This
particular law appears at the end of Book IV, immediately after the
Stranger introduces his innovative "double method"' of legislation,
one in which violently compulsory edicts are preceded by gently
persuasive preludes.' Recognizing that the lawgiver's command-
viz., that the young man "marry after he reaches the age of thirty and
before the age of thirty-five"'89 and thenceforth "care for children and
a wife"-will encounter resistance from those capable of counting
the costs of fatherhood (both financial and psychic), the Athenian
85. See id. at 838e-839a.
86. The Athenian explains:
For indeed, with regard to the community and commingling of those who are married, it
is necessary to dispel the ignorance concerning the bride's people, the bride herself, and
the people to whom they are giving her. Everything possible must be done, to the best of
one's ability, to prevent any mistakes at all being made in such affairs. To achieve such a
serious goal, play must be devised that consists of choral dancing by the boys and girls,
where they can see and be seen, in a reasonable way and at an occasion that offers
suitable pretexts. Both sexes should be naked, within the limits a moderate sense of
shame sets for each.
Id. at 771e-772a.
87. Id. at 720e. See also CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter 4.
88. See PLATO, supra note 3, at 718a ff.
89. Id. at 721b.
90. Id. at 721c.
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pronounces a "prelude" in which he seeks, rather, to appeal to the
self-interest of these selfish young men. The bait he dangles before
their eyes is their interest in eternal greatness. As he acknowledges,
"it is the nature of everyone to desire immortality in every way."91
But instead of emphasizing the tried and true methods for achieving
such-renown in athletics, warfare, politics, and art-the Athenian
argues that "by leaving behind the children of children" the
ambitious young man can gratify his "desire to become famous and
not lie nameless after [he] has died."' The Stranger well knows that
committing the self-centered young man to the other-regarding
institutions of marriage and fatherhood requires that the lawgiver
provide him with a vastly expanded concept of self.
While the first of the Stranger's two marriage laws hints at the
grounds for the young man's opposition to marriage (viz., his
recognition "that the bachelor's life is a source of gain and ease for
him"93), the second law reveals even more clearly the selfish
character of male sexual desire. This law (pronounced a bit later in
Book VI) presumes that the first has been successful: It addresses
the young man who "has found someone who pleases him and is
appropriate for sharing and procreating children."94 The Stranger
recognizes, however, that the willingness of the young man to
commit himself to the ostensibly other-regarding institution of
marriage is far from the self-abjuration the legislator desires.
This can best be seen in the vast discrepancy between the
respective benefits that the lawgiver and the groom hope to obtain
from marriage. For his part, the young man follows nature's dynastic
dictate: Should he desire to marry, the woman of choice is one whose
offspring will, in every possible way, resemble their sire. As the
domineering possessors of recessive genes have long suspected, the
surest guarantee of auto-replication- apart from cloning-is to
marry a woman like oneself. Therefore, if a groom, being himself
great, loves virtue, he will seek a woman of accomplishment; if he,
being courageous, loves valor, he will seek a woman of a hasty
disposition; if he, being handsome, loves beauty, he will seek a
comely woman; and if he, being of a renowned family, loves his clan,
he will seek a woman from among his kin. As the Athenian Stranger
observes: "It is according to nature that everyone always be
somehow attracted to what is most similar to himself."95 It is no
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 721d.
94. Id. at 772d.
95. Id. at 773b.
2000]
25
Clark: Platonic Love in a Colorado Courtroom
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
aberration in the Greek erotic imagination that the name "Justice"
was given to a certain Pharsalian mare, each of whose foals bore the
exact likeness of its respective sire.9 The strength of this desire for
self-replication-and the obstacle it poses for philosophic
lawgivers-can be discerned by recalling that Socrates' Kallipolis
foundered, in part, on the abolition of private paternity and
therewith the father's natural hope that he might yet locate in his
infant son's face the only sure sign of immortality the taciturn gods
seem willing to offer to common mortals. 7
The lawgiver, however, desires that the offspring of his citizens'
marriages be, in terms of their talents, dispositions, and genetic
composition, in every way moderate. Translated into suburban argot,
they should be well-adjusted and well-rounded children. Speaking
for the lawgiver in the prelude to his second marriage law, the
Stranger thus counsels the young man (who, unlike his profligate
peers, "has grown from good parents"98 and desires to marry) "not to
avoid someone of poor parents nor to pursue especially someone of
rich parents, but, other things being equal, always to give precedence
in honor to the less highly placed of your prospective partners."' He
goes on to advise that a "man who knows himself to be too impatient
and hasty in all his affairs should be eager to become related by
marriage to orderly parents, and one whose natural disposition is the
opposite should proceed to ally himself with the opposite sort of
in-laws."" For, as he notes, it is in the interest "of the hearths that
are being united" for the offspring of these marriages to be
"even-keeled and... commensurable." 10
At least from the lawgiver's perspective, the more compelling
reason for the formation of such unions is, however, the tremendous
peril presented to the city by the human predisposition to conjoin
with one's own: "the city as a whole becomes uneven as regards
wealth and the dispositions of characters." °" Wealthy, beautiful, and
accomplished parents will, if experience be any guide, produce
wealthy, beautiful, and accomplished children; poor, ugly, and
luckless parents will produce poor, ugly, and luckless children.
"Wish[ing] to avoid for ourselves" the consequences of the familial
perpetuation of financial and moral inequality, which are, the
96. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 4, at 1262a26.
97. See PLATO, supra note 54, at V.449a-480a; see also Allan Bloom, Interpretative Essay,
in id. at 379-89; PLATO, supra note 3, at 739c-744a; CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter 5.
98. PLATO, LAWS, supra note 3, at 772e-773a.
99. Id. at 773a.
100. Id. at 773b.
101. Id. at 773c.
102. Id. at 773b-c.
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Stranger reminds us, "very prevalent in most cities,13 he thus
declares the following match-making principle: "Let there be one
myth regarding marriage: in each marriage what must be wooed is
not what is most pleasant for oneself, but what is in the interest of
the city.""' While the Stranger began the dialogue with a declaration
regarding the politically pernicious character of sodomy, this second
marriage law suggests that the homosexual's self-love is but a
particularly outrageous instance of the entailed political inheritance
that the erotic human's sexual narcissism can bequeath to his city.
The issues raised in the Athenian's defense of his second marriage
law provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the debate with
which this essay began: What, in fact, does Plato say in this dialogue
about the naturalness of homosexuality and its relationship to the
family? What we find is that both antagonists grossly misread the
Laws, to the detriment of their respective arguments. Concerning the
"unnatural" character of sodomitic congress, Finnis claims to find a
consistent condemnation of homosexual acts as unnatural, while
Nussbaum asserts that the term "natural" is too ambiguous to be
morally meaningful. Our analysis of the second marriage law
suggests, rather, that both are wrong. Not only does the Stranger
here characterize the sexual attraction of like-to-like as "natural," he
also vigorously seeks to repress all forms of man's natural sexual
narcissism on this very basis. Nature matters greatly, but in a way
that neither perceives. Concerning the Stranger's defense of the
family, Finnis finds in the Laws a vigorous advocacy of the moral
centrality of wedded love, while Nussbaum argues that it is carnal
excess, not gender misfit, that is the source of the Laws' antipathy (if
any can be found) to the practice of sodomitic congress. Our analysis
of the second marriage law suggests, again, that both are wrong.
While the Stranger is quite clearly intent on repressing sexual
narcissism in all its forms in order to establish stable households for
the rearing of measured children, it is anything but clear that this is a
ringing defense of the moral import of monogamous marriage.
Though he enthusiastically encourages the formation of families, the
vigor of the Athenian's advocacy appears to proceed more from
reasons of state than from moral imperatives of any sort.
VI. THE ART OF RHETORIC: AN ANCIENT "BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION" THERAPY
The state's interest in repressing-albeit gently-both the
103. Id. at 773c.
104. Id. at 773b.
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narcissistic and promiscuous nature of male sexual desire can best be
seen in the Stranger's discussion of sexual matters in Book VIII. As
we have already seen, the marriage laws presented in Books IV and
VI point the reader's attention to the political problems occasioned
by these aspects of male sexual longing. In these two passages,
however, the Stranger does little more than note the deleterious
consequences of this passion and suggest the futility of legislating
against it. As the Athenian notes near the end of his discussion in
Book VI:
To enact by law, through discourse, that a rich man is not to
marry from the rich, and a man capable of doing many things is
not to marry someone similar to himself-and to compel those
of hasty dispositions to join in marriage with those who are
more phlegmatic, and the more phlegmatic with the hasty-
besides being laughable, would stir up the spiritedness of
many. 5
In Book VIII, however, the Athenian explicitly addresses how the
intelligent legislator can redirect-for the benefit of both families
and the city-the destructive sexual proclivities of idle men and
women: fornication by the young, adultery by the middle-aged,
pederasty by the old, and incest by all.
This far-ranging discussion begins with a particularly plaintive
lament. Although the Stranger has just concluded his musical and
gymnastic legislation, which he presented as the educational pillars
of his legislative project, he notes that the difficulty of implementing
them pales into insignificance when compared with the task of
regulating the citizens' libidos. Concerning education, not only is it
easy, he declares, "to know how these and other such matters should
be put in lawful order," the city "would neither gain much nor suffer
much of a penalty" were they "altered here and there."'" But
concerning the citizens' sexual behavior it is both difficult to obtain
compliance and vitally important that the lawgiver gain such: "But
there are other matters which make no small difference, about which
it is difficult to be persuasive, and which are in fact the task of the
god, if it were somehow possible to get the orders themselves from
him. ''" °" Lacking a divine solution, the Stranger pines for "some
daring (tolm~rou) human being" who would be willing to speak
"before an audience of corrupt souls,... order[ing] what is fitting
and becoming to the whole political regime; opposing the greatest
105. Id. at 773c.
106. Id. at 835b-c.
107. Id. at 835c.
[Vol. 12:1
28
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol12/iss1/1
2000]
desires, and having no human ally, all alone he will follow reason
alone.""0
Should such an outspoken man arise in the Stranger's city, he will
find, much to his surprise, that these well-educated citizens might
then prove to be more difficult to restrain than even their most randy
neighbors. As the Stranger explains to his uncomprehending
interlocutors, the Magnesian citizens' promiscuity is in fact
exacerbated by this city's greatest virtue, its victory over necessity:
When I arrived, in the course of the argument, at education, I
saw young men and young women mixing together
affectionately. As might be expected, a fear came over me as I
reflected on the problem of how someone will manage a city like
this, in which young men and women are well reared, and
released from the severe and illiberal tasks that do the most to
quench wantonness; and where sacrifices, festivals, and choruses
are the preoccupations of everyone throughout their whole
lives. How, in this city, will they ever avoid the desires that
frequently cast many down into the depths, the desires that
reason, striving to become law, orders them to avoid?'"
The Stranger does hope that certain aspects of their education will
"predominate over the mass of desires.""' He elaborates: The "fact
that it's impossible to get terrifically rich," the moderation taught by
the youths' teachers, and the "trained eye of the rulers" should all
serve "to limit the other desires as much, at least, as is humanly
possible."''. He ultimately recognizes, however, that this educa-
tionally induced moderation is unlikely to overpower the eros of the
overprivileged offspring of the city's leisured classes:
But with regard to the erotic love of and for children-both
male and female-and the erotic love of women for men and of
men for women, whence tens of thousands of things have
happened to human beings in private and to whole cities, how
could one take proper precautions?"'
He laments in conclusion: "And what sort of medicine will one
apply, in each of these cases, so as to find an escape from the
danger?"''
The answer to this question is first suggested at the end of the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 835d-e.
110. Id. at 835e-836a.
111. Id. at 836a.
112. Id. at 836a-b.
113. Id. at 836b.
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Stranger's brief but complicated attempt to elevate the Dorian
predilection for homosexual pederasty into a high-minded form of
educative mentorship. The real problem with the former practice is
that, on account of its exclusive emphasis on the pederast's selfish
gratification of his bodily pleasures, it does not "help us promote
virtue.""' The deleterious consequences of the pederast's desire to
"pick the bloom of youth" are realized in both the lover and the
beloved alike: The pederast should be condemned for his "softness"
in "giving in to the pleasures," being "incapable of mastering them,"
while the boy, for his part, is also to be reproved for "undertak[ing]
the imitation of the female.""' The Stranger's goal, therefore, is to
take the "man who loves the body, hungering for the bloom as for
ripe fruit, [who] bids himself take his fill without honoring the
disposition of soul of the beloved,"'16 and modify his desires such that
he can derive pleasure from the chaste admiration and promotion of
the virtuous boy. Such a lover, the Stranger asserts, would hold
the desire for the body to be secondary; looking at it rather than
loving it, with his soul he really desires the soul of the other and
considers the gratification of body by body to be wantonness.
He holds in awe and reverence what is moderate, courageous,
magnificent, and prudent, and would wish to remain always
chaste with a beloved who is chaste. 7
The Stranger here suggests that by appealing to these higher
pleasures, the same instinct that motivates the wayward scoutmaster
to furtively sodomize his many charges can be transformed into the
well-wishing respect that a noble teacher publicly pays to his most
gifted student.
The Stranger's strategy here parallels in a remarkable way his
earlier efforts both to introduce women into the city's common
meals"' and to persuade young men to marry: He takes a relatively
necessitous Dorian custom (such as their common meals and selfish
fretting for immortality) and transforms it into a considerably more
liberated practice by means of persuasive arguments. In the two
previous cases, the Stranger had merely suggested that popular
resistance to his painful transformations can best be overcome, not
by bald-faced coercion, but by means of enchanting song. In the case
at hand, however, the Athenian unveils the precise character of this
114. Id. at 836d.
115. ld. at 836e.
116. Id. at 837c.
117. Id. at 837c.
11& See CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter 7.
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persuasion. In the face of popular resistance to the lawgiver's
salutary efforts to ameliorate the politically and personally
destructive consequences of the private pursuit of pleasure, the
lawgiver must craft his words in such a manner as to present the
healthy but disagreeable choice as the most pleasant. "9
This is neither easy nor certain, as the Stranger himself witnesses.
Megillus, for one, -eadily succumbs to his blandishments. After
concluding the argument with the determination that the law should
forbid those exploitative forms of homosexuality in which the
pederast does not "desire that the youth become as excellent as
possible," the Stranger obtains the enthusiastic assent of "Megillus,
my friend."2 The Stranger's appeal to the superior pleasures of the
mentor's pride over the bugger's self-gratification has succeeded in
moving at least one dirty old man to consent to this law. The
Stranger suspects, however, that Kleinias remains unmoved by these
arguments, and promises Megillus that he will return with stronger
medicine for their friend:
It looks like-as I guessed-I've obtained your harmonious
assent, dear friend. I don't need to inquire what the law among
your people thinks about such things-it's sufficient to accept
your agreement to the argument. Later on I'll come back to
these same matters and try to use incantations to persuade
Kleinias."'
Before doing so, the Stranger begins an extended exposition of the
amazing art of persuasion that has moved one and by which he hopes
to move yet others.
The Athenian Stranger's legislative goal regarding his citizens'
sexual activity is relatively straightforward: He desires, like most
lawgivers, to redirect men's polymorphous erotic energy toward the
conception and rearing of healthy children in stable and loving
households. By persuading them to abstain from sodomy
("intercourse with males""), infanticide ("the deliberate killing of
the human race"'"), masturbation ("the wasting of sperm on rocks or
stones where it will never take root and generate a natural
offspring" 24 ), and adultery ("abstaining from any female field in
which you wouldn't wish your sperm to grow" 25), the Stranger
119. See id. at Chapters 2, 6, 7.
120. PLATO, supra note 3, at 837d.
121. Id. at 837e.
122. Id. at 838e.
123. Id.




Clark: Platonic Love in a Colorado Courtroom
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
anticipates that "tens of thousands of good things would result":26
It will prevent erotic frenzy and madness, as well as all
adulteries, and all excessive drinking and eating, and will make
men familiar with and dear to their own wives. Indeed, there are
very many other good things that would come to pass, if
someone had enough control to pass this law. 7
To enact this legislation, a rather tall order for even the most
single-mindedly puritanical of lawgivers, the Stranger repeatedly
boasts here of his possession of a powerful rhetorical art: "In regard
to this law I had an art that would promote the natural use of sexual
intercourse for the production of children."'"
To illustrate the power of this art, the Stranger attempts to show
how it, or something quite like it, is capable of eradicating the human
desire to commit incest, the most politically destructive of sexual
practices. As the Stranger has repeatedly asserted and demonstrated,
when it comes to sexual matters the attraction of like to like has
deleterious effects on civic unity: The marriage of wealthy men to
heiresses breeds dynasties and the coupling of men to boys fosters
factions."2 But no sexual union (at least prior to the invention of
human cloning) is more conducive to this narcissistic partheno-
genesis than the reproductive conjunction of brother with sister and
parent with child."
But with respect to incest-unlike all the other sexual practices the
Stranger has thus far considered, compromised, or condemned-the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 839a-b.
128. Id. at 838e; see also i& at 838a and 839c.
129. The contested passage with which the debate between Finnis and Nussbaum began
makes an oblique reference to the political consequences of homosexual love: "So it is with
these gymnastics and common meats: in many other ways they now benefit cities, but in the
event of civil strife they are harmful (as is shown by the examples of the Miletian, Boeotian,
and Thurian boys)." Id. at 636b. For bibliographic references and a brief discussion of these
civil wars, see Pangle, Notes to PLATO, supra note 3, at 515 n.34.
130. Pausanias explains the "narcissistic" character of the conjunction of brother with
sister in this manner:
On the summit of Helicon is a small river called the Lamus. In the territory of the
Thespians is a place called Donacon (Reed-bed). Here is the spring of Narcissus. They
say that Narcissus looked into this water, and not understanding that he saw his own
reflection, unconsciously fell in love with himself, and died of love at the spring....
There is another story about Narcissus, less popular indeed than the other, but not
without some support. It is said that Narcissus had a twin sister, they were exactly alike in
appearance, their hair was the same, they wore similar clothes, and went hunting
together. The story goes on that Narcissus fell in love with his sister, and when the girl
died, would go to the spring, knowing that it was his reflection that he saw, but in spite of
this knowledge finding some relief for his love in imagining that he saw, not his own
reflection, but the likeness of his sister.
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lawgiver does not find himself at perpetual loggerheads with the
hedonistic masses. And why not? Potentially the most powerful of
sexual desires, the yearning of a young man for his sister, the
possessor of a genetically similar but complementarily gendered
body, has been eviscerated by the pronunciation of a few powerful
words: "These things are not at all pious, but are hateful to the gods
and the most shameful of shameful things. 31 To demonstrate the
power of this phenomenon, the Stranger sets a little trap for
Megillus. After boasting that he, by virtue of "a certain art,"' 2 can
implement these various sexual regulations, the Stranger elliptically
alludes to an amazing case of erotic restraint: "Presumably, we know
that even at the present time most human beings, however lawless
they may be, nevertheless punctiliously refrain from intercourse with
beautiful persons, and do so not involuntarily, but with the greatest
possible willingness." '33 After Megillus wonders under what
circumstances this might occur, the Athenian reveals that he is
speaking of incest:
When the beautiful person is one's brother or sister. Moreover,
with regard to a son or daughter, the same unwritten law guards
in a very effective way, as it were, against touching them-by
open or secret sleeping together, or by any other sort of embrac-
ing. In fact, among the many there isn't the slightest desire for
this sort of intercourse."
Most amazing of all, the Stranger goes on to say, is that this
remarkable instance of voluntary forbearance is the result of a few
little words: "And isn't it just a little phrase that quenches all such
pleasures?" '135 As he elaborates:
Isn't the cause the fact that no one ever says anything else, but
from the moment of birth each of us hears people saying these
things, always and everywhere? In jokes and in every serious
tragedy isn't it frequently said, and when they bring on
Thyestes-figures or certain Oedipuses, or certain Macareuses,
who secretly have intercourse with their sisters, isn't it seen that
they promptly inflict upon themselves the just punishment of
death for their crime? 136
The words of the poets, repeated by the masses, are infinitely more
131. PLATO, supra note 3, at 838b-c.
132. Id. at 838a.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 838b.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 838c.
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effective in restraining these sexual desires than the most strong-
armed legislation could ever be. As the Stranger concludes,
when a lawgiver wishes to enslave a certain desire which
especially enslaves human beings, it's easy to know, at least, how
he should handle it. By having everyone-slaves, free men,
children, women, the whole city in agreement together-hold
this pronouncement to be something sacred, he will have
succeeded in making this law very firm. 37
When the Stranger first announced his possession of this art, the
reader was presented with ample evidence regarding the difficulty of
its successful implementation. Not only did Plato demonstrate that
the Stranger's two interlocutors, likely partakers of a certain Dorian
vice, responded to the Athenian's fanciful advocacy of a higher form
of pederasty with differing degrees of enthusiasm, but he also had
the Stranger forthrightly declare that, though the phrases are little,
the pronunciation thereof is anything but straightforward. As the
Stranger declares to Megillus: "In order to establish this law, I have
now a certain art, which will be in one respect easy to employ but in
another respect extremely difficult in every way.'"3 These difficulties
emerge with greater clarity as the Stranger progressively unveils the
operations of this art. The first objection comes from Megillus.
Although he acknowledges the power of popular opinion,139 he
expresses doubts about the possibility that the lawgiver's art might
yet make him an arbiter thereof: "But now how will it ever be
possible to arrange things so that everyone is willing to say such a
thing... ?,,4 The second is the vicariously expressed rage of the
dialogue's young reader, whom the Stranger conjures up after
concluding his proud description of the domestic bliss that will flow
unto his city's inhabitants: "But if there were standing here some
vehement young man full of a lot of sperm who had been listening to
the laying down of the law, he would probably revile us for setting up
mindless and impossible customs, and would fill the air with his
clamor. ' 1 No stranger to sexual repression, the old man is eager to
employ the Athenian's art and lacks only the assurance that it will in
fact work; no friend of conformity, especially that which impinges on
his jealously guarded amatory prerogatives, the young man fears its
implementation.
137. Id. at 838d-e.
138. Id. at 838a.
139. See id. at 838d ("You are quite correct to this extent: when no one ever even tries to
breathe against the law in any way, then the pronouncement has an amazing power.").
140. Id. at 838e.
141. Id. at 839b.
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The Athenian Stranger proves himself to be remarkably sensitive
to these charges. As well he should be! If anything, he has grossly
overstated his case: Not only does he make the improbable assertion
that ineffable blessings will flow unto those men who suffer the
tedium (so it is said) of lifelong heterosexual monogamy, he knows
that the intelligent observer can entertain reasonable doubts as to
the practicality of his methods, if not the rationality of his aims. To
prove his assertions, the Athenian calls to our attention two
examples of the human triumph over short-term pleasures for
long-term benefits. The first is the Dorian lawgivers' institution of
common meals. While "it's not believed that an entire city can live
practicing this throughout its life,"'' 2 the Stranger points out that "the
disbelief was refuted by the deed, by the fact that it actually came to
pass among your people."'4 3 In a nod to his earlier (and elliptical)
discussion of the inclusion of women in this practice,'" the Stranger
here suggests that it is this art that will in fact accelerate their
integration.'45
The second is the sexual forbearance of athletes for the sake of
victory. To demonstrate "that it is not beyond human ability, but is
in fact possible"'" for the lawgiver to obtain compliance to his law,
he invokes the examples of several renowned athletes. One of these
is Iccus of Tarentum, a man who "was so filled with love of victory,
and possessed in his soul such art, and such courage mixed with
moderation, that he never touched a woman-or a boy, for that
matter-during the entire time of his intensive training.'' 47 The
willingness of this far-sighted man and other athletes, men whose
"souls were much less educated than the citizens that belong to me
and you" and whose "bodies were much more full blooded,"'" "to
refrain from an activity that the many say is happy" for "the sake of
victory in wrestling and running and that sort of thing"'49 bodes well,
the Stranger argues, for the success of his enterprise. If men who are
"inferior" to the Magnesian citizens "have shown the capacity to
master" these base pleasures for the sake of athletic victory, why
should not the well-educated Magnesians also attain "victory over
pleasures"T5 As the Athenian queries Kleinias, who has begun to
142. Id. at 839c-d.
143. Id. at 839d.
144. See id. at 780a-781e.
145. See CLARK, supra note 53, at Chapter 7.
146. PLATO, supra note 3, at 839d.
147. Id. at 840a.
148. Id. at 840a-b.
149. Id. at 840b.
150. Id. at 840c.
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take an interest in this argument, "now will our children be unable to
restrain themselves for the sake of a much nobler victory, whose
great beauty we will have, it is likely, enchanted them with from the
time they were babies, using spellbinding myths, speeches, and
songs?" ''
VII. PRESCRIBING FOR A CIVIC MALADY
Upon coming to the end of our survey of sexual legislation in the
Laws, it is remarkable, at least to this observer, how the actual
contour of the rumpled bedscape of Platonic sexuality differs from
our expectations. Had we given much credence to the arguments that
Professors Finnis and Nussbaum advanced in Evans v. Romer, we
would know only that Plato served as Hephaestus for our own
cultural wars, forging armaments for the exposed outer flanks in the
modern battles against, respectively, iniquity and bigotry. By
condemning homosexual intercourse as "contrary to nature," Plato
clearly displays-if Finnis's account is to be credited-the prescient
instincts of a preternatural advocate of the natural law. On the other
hand, by means of a facile declaration of the futility of any
understanding of the nature of human sexual desire, Nussbaum
interprets the Laws' various attempts at sexual legislation to be
prohibitions against the carnal enjoyment of any sexual encounter
rather than condemnations of perversity in the choice of partner.
Confusing when viewed in tandem, wrong when examined
individually, these two analyses were ultimately (and not surpris-
ingly) ignored in Judge Bayless's resolution of the Amendment 2
dispute.
While Judge Bayless appears to have concluded (perhaps rightly)
that Plato's Laws-at least as it was presented to him-was not
appropriately dispositive of the case at bar, we should not be so
quick to conclude that Plato's final reflection on the art of politics
has nothing to teach us about the nature of (homo)sexual desire, the
weaknesses of the nuclear family, and the city's interest in
redirecting the former to thereby sustain the latter. Romer has been
decided, but the underlying issue remains. Can Plato help us address
it?
Carefully read and properly understood, the Athenian Stranger's
sexual legislation reveals that Plato was less interested in serving as
an ideological blacksmith than as a privy counselor to statesmen of
all ages. Nature and its implications matter immensely for the
protagonist of this dialogue, but in a way that both Finnis and
151. Id. at 840b-c.
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Nussbaum fail to recognize. Neither a stiff standard for caning nor a
formless jellyfish best left floating at sea, the Athenian Stranger's
invocation of nature is a deliberate attempt to provoke our reflection
on the most difficult and important challenge in political life:
encouraging civic hybridization.
This is likely obscured by the fact that the first discussion of
sexuality in the dialogue, the disputed passage at 636b-c, is in fact an
instance of ideological caning: Kleinias, a man who has already
declared that the necessities of nature establish the baseline for his
understanding of politics, is being intentionally provoked by the
Athenian's suggestion that the Dorian penchant for homosexual
pederasty might well be "contrary to nature." Once the Stranger has
the leisure to talk at length about nature and sexuality (perhaps
because the moment of his own agon has already passed), we
discover what really concerns him. It is not, as the initial exchange
suggested, that homosexuality is unnatural, and hence wicked, but,
rather, that there appears to be a natural proclivity for it and all
other forms of like-like attraction. As the Stranger declares in Book
VI, "[i]t is according to nature that everyone always be somehow
attracted to what is most similar to himself."'52 Even though this
attraction is natural-or perhaps precisely because it is such-the
city needs to overcome it. Rather than allow the autonomous
functioning of man's natural cupidity to perpetuate the formation of
clans and parties--those institutions most adept at preserving and
fostering financial inequality and political division-the goal of the
far-sighted statesman is to match opposites in marriage: the rich with
the poor, the hasty with the orderly, and, lest it be forgotten, the
male with the female.
It is this task, the conjunction of dissimilars into a civic unity, that
presents statesmen with their greatest challenge. Students of politics
well know the ease with which a Machiavellian politician can set one
party against another. The Laws seeks to teach its reflective readers
to resist precisely this temptation. Instead of encouraging our
divisive inclinations, Plato charges his readers, ancient and modern,
to understand how disparate elements-of the city, of the soul, and
of the human race-can be brought into peaceful community.
Recognizing the resistant misapprehension this suggestion will
encounter, particularly with regard to the "commingling that
produces children,"'53 the Athenian Stranger invokes at one point in
the dialogue a more readily comprehensible metaphor for his
objective: the wine-mixing bowl. The Greek drink of choice was
152. Id. at 773b.
153. Id. at 773d.
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actually a mixture of two vastly different liquids: concentrated wine
and tasteless water.'"' One dangerous, the other innocuous, prior to
consumption they were brought together in the mixing bowl, where
the strength of one complemented the weakness of the other: "For
it's not easily understood that a city should be mixed, just like the
drinker's bowl: The wine, when poured in, is throbbing with
madness, but under the chastening of another, sober god, it forms a
noble partnership that creates a good and measured drink.' 55
In his command to prepare this equanimous beverage, the
Stranger does not leave us without the necessary bar-tending tools.
For those willing to read the dialogue with care, Plato presents not
only abundant indication of both the promiscuous and narcissistic
nature of male sexual desire but also an elaborate exposition of the
rhetorical art with which men's pernicious desires can be redirected
for the benefit of the city. By means of the gentle pronunciation of
well-chosen words, the well-taught statesman can persuade his male
citizens to marry unattractive women, father mediocre children, and
care for their demanding broods-against their natural inclinations
to the contrary.
As our city seeks to reckon with the current call for public
approbation of male homosexual license, Plato's valedictory
reflection on the constitution and care of the healthy body politic
might help us begin to engage ourselves with the diagnosis and
treatment of that which he-an ancient paragon of insight now
invoked by both plaintiff and defendant in Evans v. Romer-most
importantly took to be a civic malady, not a personal one.
154. HOMER, ODYSSEY 1.110 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper Perennial 1991).
155. PLATO, supra note 3, at 773c-d.
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